Prev Chronic Dis by Levine, Beverly
VOLUME 4: NO. 1 JANUARY 2007
What Does the Population Attributable
Fraction Mean?
SPECIAL TOPIC
Suggested citation for this article: Levine B. What does the
population attributable fraction mean? Prev Chronic Dis
[serial online] 2007 Jan [date cited]. Available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/jan/06_0091.htm.
PEER REVIEWED
Abstract
Recent controversy over the disagreement of population
attributable fraction estimates for the obesity total mortal-
ity relation has made the concept of attributable fraction
visible in both scientific and popular news. Most of the
attention in writings on the attributable fraction has
focused on technical matters of estimation and on ensuring
a causal relationship between exposure and outcome. Yet
some of the most illuminating questions about the attrib-
utable fraction have to do with another causal question
and how the measure is to be interpreted in light of the
answer to this question: What interventions are available
to cause the assumed reduction in risk among the exposed
and the consequent estimated reduction in disease burden?
In this paper, I discuss the limitations to the common
interpretations of the attributable fraction and argue that
these limitations cannot be overcome merely by better sta-
tistical modeling or by use of better data sets. They must
be addressed through discussion of specific interventions
and the hypothesized causal consequences of such speci-
fied interventions.
Introduction
Recent controversy over the accuracy of population
attributable fraction (AF) estimates for the obesity–total
mortality relation has made the concept of AF (also called
attributable risk) highly visible in both scientific and popu-
lar news. Both the Institute of Medicine (1) and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2) have
sponsored recent workshops on the topic of how best to
estimate the effects of obesity on the risk of mortality in
the United States and how to resolve disagreements over
published estimates (3,4). Many scientific resources have
been directed toward this topic, and the discussion has
been published in top medical and scientific journals in the
United States (3-6).
This article will not address the political or scientific
aspects of this controversy. Its purpose is to discuss the
general use of the AF estimate as a practical tool in applied
epidemiology and public health.
Definition
The AF is formally written as
P(D) – P(D | )
P(D)
where P(D) is the (unconditional) probability of disease
over a specified time period, and P(D | ) is the probabili-
ty of disease over the same time period conditional on non-
exposed status (not exposed to the risk factor under study).
The AF is the difference between overall average risk of
the entire population (both exposed and unexposed people)
and average risk in the unexposed, expressed as a fraction
of the overall average risk.
Depending on the types of data available, there are dif-
ferent formulas used to estimate the AF. Much of the dis-
cussion in epidemiology textbooks, in the section on AF in
the Encyclopedia of Biostatistics (7,8), and in articles on AF
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in epidemiologic and biostatistical journals is devoted to
the technical topic of choosing the most appropriate for-
mula for estimating the above fraction, given various con-
straints, once it can be assumed that there is a causal rela-
tionship between exposure and disease. Yet some of the
most interesting questions about the AF have to do with
another causal question that cannot be answered through
recourse to technical discussion: What interventions are
available to cause the assumed reduction in risk among the
exposed and the consequent estimated reduction in disease
burden? Such a question is rarely, if ever, discussed in
writings on the AF.
Before addressing the central point — that this other
causal question is critical to the significance of the AF — I
first discuss the two most common interpretations of the
AF. These interpretations, although related, are not equiv-
alent. First, the AF is widely interpreted as the proportion
of disease burden causally explained by, or attributable to,
the risk factor(s) being considered. Second, the AF is the
proportion of disease risk that would be eliminated from the
population if exposure to the risk factor were eliminated.
The AF as a partitioning of causality
The interpretation of the AF as the proportion of disease
burden attributable to a factor (or a set of factors) is com-
monly used by those who wish to differentiate between the
portion of disease risk that is understood and the portion
that remains to be understood. This interpretation has
been used in breast cancer. For example, reports of AFs of
about 25% for the major breast cancer risk factors have
been used to imply that 75% of the disease of breast cancer
is not understood or is not attributable to known causes
(8). This interpretation is also sometimes used by genetic
epidemiologists to estimate what proportion of disease is
causally attributable to genes (9-11). With AFs such as
these, no interventions are intended. The fractions are
estimated for the purpose of summarizing and partitioning
causal knowledge — often between known and unknown
causes, as has been the case in breast cancer — or between
genetic and nongenetic causes.
Underlying this interpretation is the philosophical ques-
tion of what we mean when we say that a certain percent-
age of disease in the population is caused by, attributable
to, or explainable by a given risk factor or set of factors.
Greenland and Robins (12) tackle the issue of what is
meant by the phrase attributable to (5) when they draw a
distinction between excess and etiologic cases. They pro-
vide a thorough discussion of the difference between these
kinds of cases and show why the AF will usually greatly
underestimate the proportion of disease burden that is eti-
ologically related to the exposure.
Another concern with the interpretation of the AF as the
proportion of disease caused by an exposure stems from
the model of causes that underlies much of epidemiology.
This model of sufficient component causes holds that a
given case of disease could theoretically have been averted
over a considered time period if any one of a sufficient set
of causes were averted. The AF for different exposures con-
sidered one at a time will usually sum to greater than
100% (greater than the total number of cases) for a given
outcome. In the single-factor-at-a-time AF analytic
method, a death or a case of disease (e.g., myocardial
infarction) attributable to exposure X (e.g., hypertension)
could also be, and often is, attributable to exposure Y (e.g.,
elevated cholesterol levels). Thus, the consideration of an
outcome as attributable to (or caused by) exposure X
(rather than Y) is often arbitrary.
A third reason to question the use of the AF in causal
partitioning is that a large AF may reflect merely a broad
exposure definition rather than any valuable understand-
ing about causality. As an extreme example of this, con-
sider that one could report an AF of 100% if one were to
consider age >15 years as a risk factor for breast cancer.
This would say nothing about causality. As Wacholder et
al (13) demonstrate, the AF will always increase with a
broader definition of exposure provided that the individu-
als newly included under the broader definition have a rel-
ative risk for disease greater than 1.0 when compared with
the remaining unexposed group. As an exposure definition
is made more sensitive (i.e., broader), the AF will increase,
but the absolute risk of disease in the exposed category will
decline as long as there is a monotonic dose–response rela-
tionship between exposure level and risk of disease. For
many scientists, it is a high absolute risk of disease rather
than a broad exposure definition (and high AF) that is key
to valuable information about causality.
Interpretation of the AF as a partition delineating what
proportion of disease or mortality risk scientists should
consider causally related and causally unrelated to a given
factor is problematic. Kempthorne, in a classic Biometrics
paper (14), argued against any attempt to quantitatively
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partition causality when multiple factors or forces deter-
mine the outcome. He stated that the results of such par-
titioning attempts are meaningless for understanding
causal processes and for considering realistic effects of
intervention.
The AF as proportion of preventable disease
The AF is frequently interpreted as the proportion of dis-
ease risk or incidence that could be eliminated from the
population if exposure were eliminated. The expectation is
that the AF has a practical value for those interested in
public health prevention policy, particularly when dealing
with an exposure that is modifiable.
When the AF is interpreted as the proportion of disease
risk that could be eliminated from the population if expo-
sure were eliminated, the simple fraction is interpreted as
an answer to the following narrow, precise question:
What proportion of disease risk could be eliminated
if absolute risk in the exposed were to suddenly and
sustainably go to the level of absolute risk in the
unexposed, while nothing else, including absolute
risk in the unexposed, were to change?
This question subsumes another more common, narrow-
er question:
What proportion of disease risk could be eliminated
if exposure were to be eliminated, while nothing else
changed?
Given the algebraic structure of the AF, the modifiabili-
ty (or elimination) of exposure is not the key criterion. The
key is elimination of excess risk associated with exposure,
which can theoretically happen in various ways besides
actual elimination of exposure.
A rephrasing of the questions in the previous example is
helpful because it points out the severe limitation to the
interpretation of the AF as a proportion of disease risk that
can be eliminated. The question,
What proportion of disease risk could be eliminated
if the absolute risk in the exposed were to suddenly
and sustainably go to the level of absolute risk in the
unexposed, while nothing else, including absolute
risk in the unexposed, were to change?
is an interesting and valuable question only if one can also
ask and answer the following question:
What intervention is available to cause the disease
risk in the exposed to quickly become that of the unex-
posed, while simultaneously changing nothing else?
If this second question sounds meaningless in a given sit-
uation — perhaps because no such intervention nor any-
thing close has been proved — I would argue that the
interpretation of the AF as the proportion of disease risk
that can be eliminated is also meaningless because the
fundamental assumption underlying the AF, that disease
risk in the exposed immediately becomes that of the unex-
posed, is impossible to meet.
It is an irony that in all the discussions about AF, the
causality question that has received the most attention is
whether or not there is truly a causal relationship between
exposure and outcome. An example is the discussion about
AF in the Encyclopedia of Biostatistics (7) in which the
three conditions that must be met for the AF to be inter-
preted as the proportion of disease risk that can be elimi-
nated are the following: 1) the estimation of the AF is unbi-
ased; 2) the exposure is causal rather than merely associ-
ated with disease; and 3) elimination of the risk factor has
to have no effect on the distribution of other risk factors. If
one cannot assume a causal relationship between exposure
and disease, calculation of the AF has no clear value. It is
also true, however, that there is an equally important
question of causality that needs to be addressed if the
above interpretation of the AF is to have any meaning:
What intervention is available to cause the assumed reduc-
tion in disease risk? This question has received scant, if
any, attention in the literature on attributable fraction.
Yet we have data available in many situations where an
AF is estimated to at least begin to address this question.
Returning to the specific topic that began this article —
AF estimation for the obesity and mortality association —
suppose there were a scientific consensus that the preva-
lence of obesity could be greatly reduced in the United
States. Different interventions to achieve this reduction
would have different effects on the burden of mortality.
Hernan (15) points out that the notion of causal effect is
not well defined unless one can specify an intervention,
even a hypothetical one, to eliminate the cause. He notes
that the value of the counterfactual outcome (which in
the obesity–mortality AF situation is the number of deaths
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that would be eliminated following the elimination of obe-
sity) depends entirely on the actual intervention used to
manipulate exposure. A strategy to eliminate (or greatly
reduce) the prevalence of obesity in the United States that
relied upon successful persuasion of overweight and obese
individuals in the population to adopt eating and activity
patterns that led to safe and sustainable weight loss would
have very different consequences for public health and
mortality than a strategy that relied on widespread use of
gene therapy or liposuction to eliminate excess weight.
These planned interventions would have different conse-
quences from a catastrophic event that resulted in a great
reduction in prevalence of overweight and obesity. None of
these hypothetical interventions necessarily has its causal
effect captured in the obesity–mortality AF estimate.
Some have used the AF to rank order exposures in terms
of their hypothetical public health priority even if there is
no available or proposed intervention. For example, if the
AF estimate for risk factor X is higher than that for risk
factor Y, a conclusion might be that risk factor X is the
more burdensome exposure and should receive more atten-
tion from a prevention standpoint. But issues of available
or potential interventions, the risks and benefits of such
interventions, and the relation of the exposure to other
exposures in the population (i.e., is it feasible to hypothe-
size about changing the exposure while holding all other
risk factors unchanged?) must be rigorously addressed
before one can assume that an exposure with a higher AF
is more important for policy makers to consider than
another exposure. The topic of how public health priorities
should be set is beyond the scope of this article, but
Buchanan presents a thought-provoking discussion rele-
vant to this complex topic (16).
Conclusion
As discussed previously in this article and as stated by
Kempthorne (14), attempts to partition causality when
multiple forces act together to produce the outcome are
meaningless. With respect to interpretation of an AF as
the proportion of disease risk that could be eliminated if
the excess risk associated with exposure were to be elimi-
nated, there may be valuable meaning under a specific set
of assumptions. In addition to the assumptions commonly
listed in textbooks, there is one more critical assumption:
that we can envision a specific intervention that will cause
the estimated reduction in risk in the exposed while
changing no other risk factor distributions.
Some might argue that in the absence of this last
assumption, the AF nonetheless allows for an interesting
theoretical case study (i.e., what would happen to the dis-
ease burden if we were to find and use such an interven-
tion?). Because such theoretical cases are not subject to
tests of falsifiability, we must ask ourselves rigorously, in
each case, what purpose they serve. For many exposures,
it is time for more complex and specific theoretical case
studies than simple AF estimation. These more complex
theoretical experiments would hypothesize about effects
of specific interventions to reduce or eliminate exposure
risk in specific populations and subpopulations by using
the diverse data gained from public health activities. In
the work of Berry et al (17), there is elegant precedent for
such complex thought experiments and for the careful
use of existing data to draw as precise a conclusion as
possible about the public health consequences of specific
interventions.
The AF is only a simple fraction derived from the arith-
metic manipulation of probabilities. As with many other
measures in public health, how this fraction is interpreted
is key. In some settings it has taken on a life of its own,
regardless of its meaning in reality. The burden is on those
providing AF estimates to state what their value is to pub-
lic health professionals and policy makers. The rest of us in
the public health community have the responsibility to
continually draw the discussion of AF estimates back to
the central question of public health implications.
This paper is not an argument for never computing a
population AF. It is an argument for more clarity, justifi-
cation, and complex thinking when using this measure.
AFs are only a beginning of the discussion of the public
health consequences of intervening to reduce the preva-
lence of risk exposures.
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